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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
SARA-ANN P. FEARON, 
Charging Party, 
- a n d - CASE NO. U-22492 
BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE CITY SCHOOL 
DISTRICT OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK and 
UNITED FEDERATION OF TEACHERS, 
Respondents. 
SHELLMAN JOHNSON & ASSOCIATES FOR EQUAL EDUCATION 
(SHELLMAN JOHNSON, Chief Advocate), for Charging Party 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
The charging party, Sara-Ann P. Fearon, through her representative, Shellman 
Johnson, has moved this Board to reconsider our Decision and Order previously issued 
August 16, 2001.1 Respondents have not filed any papers in opposition. 
Having reviewed the moving papers, we determine that there is neither newly 
discovered material nor overlooked propositions of law to justify reconsideration of our 
Decision and Order issued August 16, 2001. 
The charging party argues that we have accepted a different standard of 
compliance for pro se parties appearing before us, citing Marlboro Faculty Association 
) 
134 PERB H3031 (2001). 
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(Schanzenbach), 29 PERB fl3007 (1996).2 While we have been somewhat lenient in 
the content of pleadings received from pro se parties, as we held in Marlboro, supra, we 
have never sacrificed adherence to our Rules for the benefit of pro se parties.3 
Accordingly, the motion for reconsideration is denied.4 
DATED: October 11,J2001 
Albany, New York 
lael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
T. Mitchell, Member 
2We note that, although Mr. Johnson argues in his papers that Ms. Fearon is 
appearing pro se, Mr. Johnson appears on her behalf. 
3See CSEA, Inc., Local 1000, 22 PERB ^3020 (1989) (compliance with the 
Rules); United Fed'n of Teachers and Bd. ofEduc. of the City Sch. Dist. of the City of 
New York, 19 PERB 1J3049 (1986) (timeliness). 
4United Fed'n of Teachers (Freedman), 34 PERB 1J3005 (2001) (citing cases). 
(" ^ STATE OF NEW YORK PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
MARTIN FREEDMAN, 
Charging Party, 
- a n d - CASE NO. U-22063 
BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE CITY SCHOOL 
DISTRICT OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, 
Respondent. 
MARTIN FREEDMAN, pro se 
DALE KUTZBACH, GENERAL COUNSEL (JERRY N. ROTHMAN of counsel), 
for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by Martin Freedman to a decision of 
an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) dismissing an improper practice charge he filed 
alleging that his employer, the Board of Education of the City School District of the City 
of New York (District), had violated §209-a.1(a) of the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act (Act) by retaliating against him for filing an earlier improper practice 
charge against the United Federation of Teachers (UFT), which named the District as a 
<• 
statutory party.1 A hearing was held at which Freedman appeared pro se and the 
1The District was made a statutory party to that case, Case No. U-20764, 
pursuant to §209-a.3 of the Act. 
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District was represented by counsel. At the close of Freedman's case, which consisted 
of the introduction in evidence of certain documents and Freedman's narrative 
testimony, the District made a motion to dismiss. The ALJ closed the record and 
directed the parties to submit written argument on the motion. Thereafter, the ALJ 
issued a decision, dismissing the jnstantcharge, finding that there was no evidence that 
those who had either made the decisions or taken the actions complained of by 
Freedman in the improper practice charge had any knowledge of his protected activities 
and that there was no evidence to establish any improper motive for the District's 
actions. 
EXCEPTIONS 
Freedman excepts to the ALJ's decision, arguing that District representatives 
knew about his protected activities and that the ALJ should have required the District to 
put in its case because his cross-examination of the District's witnesses would have 
assisted him in proving his case. The District has not responded to Freedman's 
exceptions. 
Based upon our review of the record and consideration of the arguments offered 
by Freedman, we affirm the decision of the ALJ. 
FACTS 
rreeurnan nas ueen ernpioyeu as a ieacner uy mc L I^SLNCI since io89. in uune 
1999, an improper practice charge filed by Freedman against UFT and in which the 
District was named as a statutory party, was settled. Freedman alleges that as a result 
of the settlement, the District assigned him to a teaching position in May 2000, that 
precluded him, under the terms of the District-UFT collective bargaining agreement, 
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from being eligible for a seniority transfer. He further alleges that he applied for a 
teaching assignment for the 2000 summer school session but that his application never 
received a response from the District. Even so, he did receive notification in September 
2000 that he had received a summer school appointment but, because he had failed to 
report for duty, he was receiving an unsatisfactory rating and would be ineligible for 
appointment to a 2001 summer school position. Freedman filed a grievance regarding 
the summer school appointment for which he alleges he did not receive a response 
within the contractual time limits. He further alleges that he was not informed that a 
grievance hearing was adjourned. Finally, Freedman alleges that he did not receive a 
response from the District to a September 2000 health and welfare benefits inquiry or a 
September 2000 union disability benefit form until the end of October 2000. 
DISCUSSION 
As the ALJ correctly recognized, in deciding a motion to dismiss at the close of a 
charging party's case, we "must assume the truth of all the charging party's evidence 
and give the charging party the benefit of all reasonable inferences that could be drawn 
from those assumed facts."2 Even giving Freedman every reasonable inference that can 
be drawn from the evidence he introduced at the hearing, he has failed to sustain a 
prima facie case of improper motivation. 
u iS wen a e u i o u uicu in U I U O I i u CSICI IJ I IS I I <a VIUICUIUI I u i § ^ u » - a . \\a) u i m c AAOI, m o 
charging party must prove that he or she was engaged in protected activities, that the 
respondent had knowledge of those activities and would not have taken the action 
; 2County of Nassau (Police Dep't), 17 PERB fl3013, at 3030 (1984). 
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complained of in the improper practice charge but for the charging party's exercise of 
protected rights.3 
Only the first of these three elements is established on this record. Freedman 
filed an improper practice charge and the filing of an improper practice charge is an 
activity that is protected by the Act.4 The record is, however, devoid of evidence as to 
who took the actions complained of in the charge and whether those individuals had 
any knowledge of Freedman's prior improper practice charge. Only one District 
representative was named by Freedman as taking one of the actions complained of and 
he introduced no evidence to establish either knowledge or motivation, improper or 
otherwise, on that individual's part. Evidence of improper motivation by any other 
District representative is also totally lacking on this record. 
Finally, Freedman argues that the granting of the motion to dismiss deprived him 
of the opportunity to cross-examine witnesses to be called by the District and establish 
his prima facie case. As we have previously held, a charging party cannot rely upon 
cross-examination of the respondent's witnesses to establish a prima facie case.5 
Based on the foregoing, we deny Freedman's exceptions and affirm the decision 
oftheALJ. 
3Town of independence, 23 PERB ^3020 .(1990). See also State of New York 
(Darcy), 33 PERB P046 (2000); Town ofRamapo, 32 PERB fl3077 (1999); Plainedge 
Union Free Sen. Dist, 31 PERB TJ3063 (1998). 
ACity of Lockport, 22 PERB ^3059 (1989); Binghamton CitySch. Dist, 22 PERB 
U3034(1989). 
5State of New York, 33 PERB fl3024 (2000); Nanuet Union Free Sch. Dist. and 
Nanuet Teachers Ass'n, 17 PERB ^3005 (1984). 
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IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the charge must be, and it hereby is, 
dismissed. 
DATED: October 11, 2001 
Albany, New York 
Michael R, Cuevas, Chairman 
J®hn T. Mitchell, Member 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
) PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
SUFFOLK COUNTY ASSOCIATION OF 
MUNICIPAL EMPLOYEES, INC., 
Charging Party, 
. . a n d - CASE NO. U-21051 
COUNTY OF SUFFOLK LEGISLATURE AND 
THE COUNTY OF SUFFOLK, 
Respondents. 
SOLOMON RICHMAN GREENBERG, P.C. (FREDRICK J. RICHMAN of 
counsel), for Charging Party 
BERKMAN, HENOCH, PETERSON & PEDDY, P.C. (PETER SULLIVAN of 
counsel), for Respondents 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This matter comes to us on exceptions filed by the County of Suffolk (County) to 
an Administrative Law Judge's (ALJ) decision which found a violation of §209-a.1(a) of 
the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) when, on April 20, 1999, the County 
of Suffolk Legislature (Legislature) adopted a resolution waiving the one-year service 
eligibility for tuition reimbursement for an individual employee in the unit represented by 
the Suffolk County Association of Municipal Employees, Inc. (AME). 
Board - U-21051 -2 
EXCEPTIONS 
In its exceptions, the County of Suffolk argues, in substance, that the ALJ erred 
in applying the law to the facts. 
FACTS 
The facts are fully set forth [n the ALTs decision.1 We will confine our reviewto 
the salient facts relevant to the exceptions filed by the County. The parties submitted a 
Stipulation of Agreed Facts, together with a Stipulated Record, to the ALJ in lieu of a 
hearing. 
Exhibit L of the Stipulated Record contains §A6-2 of the County's Administrative 
Code, entitled "Tuition Reimbursement Program", which implements the tuition 
reimbursement provision of the parties' collective bargaining agreement. This section 
of the Code was adopted by the County in 1970 and amended in 1979. Subsection D 
establishes a service requirement of one year before a full-time employee is eligible for 
tuition reimbursement. However, subsection F, entitled "Limitations", and, in particular, 
subparagraphs 2 and 4, are also relevant to our inquiry. Subparagraph 2 sets the limit 
to the number of courses which may be approved at two. Subparagraph 4 provides that 
course approval must be granted prior to the commencement of the course or courses 
as a condition to tuition reimbursement and in accordance with provisions of subsection 
C, ioi-]UMiiiy, unci aiia, men u ic y u u i o c wi o u u i a c o Lemon I I I U O I u c i c i c v a m I\J u i s 
employee's present job and that the employee must receive a passing grade for each 
course. 
; 134PERB H4579(2001). 
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On August 25, 1997, Daniel J. Dresch, Jr. submitted an application for approval 
of tuition reimbursement for four courses or twelve credit hours. The courses were to 
run from September 3, 1997 to December 1997.2 On September 12, 1997, the 
County informed Mr. Dresch that it would not approve his application. The reason 
stated was that Mr. Dresch had not been employed for one year prior to the^ppjication. 
He was hired on August 25, 1997, and he would have completed his first year on 
August 25, 1998.3 
Nevertheless, Mr. Dresch completed the Fall semester and, thereafter, submitted 
an application for tuition reimbursement for the Spring semester January 31, 1998 to 
May 1998.4 Again, the County denied the application.5 Dresch had enrolled in three 
courses during the Spring semester. 
David S. Greene, Director of Labor Relations, in a memorandum dated 
December 17,1997,6 advised the County's Personnel Officer not to reverse the denial 
of Dresch's tuition reimbursement, pointing to the eligibility requirement. In addition, 
Greene pointed out that the Civil Service Department records the names of employees 
who request application forms for tuition reimbursement. Civil Service had no record of 
Dresch ever requesting such a form from their office. Greene could only speculate that 
2Exhibit 9, Stipulated Record. 
3Exhibit 9, Stipulated Record. 
4Exhibit 11, Stipulated Record. 
5Exhibit 12, Stipulated Record. 
6Exhibit 7, Stipulated Record. 
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Dresch was given an outdated form through his own department without first consulting 
with Civil Service about his eligibility for tuition reimbursement. 
Dresch appealed the denials to the County Legislature. At the meeting of the 
Legislature's Personnel Committee, Greene advised the Committee that to reverse the 
denial would set a dangerous precedent. In addition, he pointed out that there is a 
contract between the employees and Suffolk County that contains a provision for tuition 
reimbursement. He cautioned that to bargain individually with every employee that 
comes aboard violates the Taylor Law.7 
Notwithstanding Greene's admonition, the Legislature adopted a resolution 
granting tuition reimbursement to Dresch.8 The County Executive thereafter vetoed the 
resolution, but the Legislature overrode his veto. AME then filed the instant charge. 
Dresch has not yet received the reimbursement. 
DISCUSSION 
The County argues in its exceptions that, since it has the authority to adopt rules, 
it has the corresponding right to modify or alter those same rules. This reasoning 
ignores the County's obligation under the Act. As a party to a collective bargaining 
agreement, the County is obligated to avoid conduct that would interfere with public 
employees in the exercise of their rights under §202 of the Act.9 If we were to accept 
the County's argument, the County through its Legislature could unilaterally adopt 
7Exhibit D, Stipulated Record. 
Resolution No. 315-1999. 
9Section 209-a.1 (a) of the Act. 
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legislation for individual employees at will, thereby avoiding the collective bargaining 
process. 
The focus of the County's exceptions is on its legislative authority to adopt rules 
and regulations. The stated purpose of the Dresch resolution belies this argument. 
The Administrative Code was adopted to providIe!_an_administrative procedure within 
which the collective bargaining agreement could be implemented. Specifically, 
paragraph 7 of the Stipulation of Agreed Facts illustrates the interplay between the 
Administrative Code and the collective bargaining agreement with respect to tuition 
reimbursement. The whole focus of the Administrative Code and the provisions of the 
collective bargaining agreement is a plan covering all unit employees equally and 
obviating the need to address tuition reimbursement requests on an individual basis. 
We have long held that payment or reimbursement of the cost of education or 
training is an aspect of employee compensation.10 "[T]he provision of benefits that are 
more than what is called for in a collective bargaining agreement is inherently 
destructive of a union's representation rights. It can be construed to give a message 
that the unit employees would do better if they abandoned their union."11 While there is 
no showing of animus in this stipulated record, we have found, in a previous case 
involving this respondent, that no showing of animus is necessary where the action 
™Town of Henrietta, 20 PERB 1J3013 (1987); Local 343, IAFF, AFL-CIO, 17 PERB 
TJ3121 (1984); Troy Uniformed Firefighters Ass'n, Local 2304, IAFF, 10 PERB *{3Q15 
(1977); New York State Professional Firefighters Ass'n, Inc., Local 461, 9 PERB 1J3069 
(1976); Board ofEduc. of Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 3 of the Town of Huntington, 30 
NY2d 122, 5 PERB 1J7507 (1972). 
; 
"Connetquot Cent. Sch. Dist, 19 PERB P045, at 3097 (1986). 
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involved is so destructive of the union's status that "the Legislature must be deemed to 
have actual or presumptive knowledge that its action would be coercive."12 
Although it is usually the executive branch that is seen as the "employer" for 
Taylor Law purposes, we have recognized that legislative bodies often act in an 
executive capacity.13 When so acting, legislative bodies are equally subject to the 
proscriptions of the Act against "bad faith" conduct14 and other conduct, as here, that 
violates the Taylor Law.15 
There is nothing in the language of the parties' collective bargaining agreement, 
nor the County's Administrative Code, authorizing the County to unilaterally modify the 
terms and conditions of tuition reimbursement. We, therefore, find that the County's 
unilateral adoption of the Dresch resolution violates §209-a.1(a) of the Act. 
Based upon the foregoing, we deny the County's exceptions and we affirm the 
decision of the ALJ. 
^County of Suffolk and Suffolk County Legislature, 15 PERB 1J3021, at 3035 (1982), 
wherein we found a violation of §209-a.1(a) when the Legislature unilaterally granted 
step increases. There, as here, the union objected to the unilateral action. 
13
 Jefferson Co. Bd. of Supervisors, 6 PERB j[3031 (1973), modified, 44 AD2d 893, 7 
PERB U7009 (4th Dep't 1974), aff'd, 36 NY2d 534, 8 PERB 1J7008 (1975). 
uBoardofEduc, Cent. Sch. Dist. No. 1, Towns of Conklin, Binghamton, Kirkwood and 
Vestal, 6 PERB 1J4526, aff'd, 6 PERB 1J3049 (1973). 
^County of Suffolk and Suffolk County Legislature, supra note 12. See also Board of 
Trustees, Vill. ofKenmore, 12 PERB 1J4502 (1979). 
Board - U-21051 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the County: 
-7 
1. Forthwith rescind Resolution No. 315-1999; 
2. Cease and desist from adopting legislative resolutions unilaterally granting 
Dresch a waiver of eligibility requirements for participation in its tuition 
reimbursement program; and 
3. Sign and post the attached notice at all locations normally used to 
communicate with employees in the AME negotiating unit. 
DATED: October 11, 2001 
Albany, New York 
tael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
Marc A. Abbott. Memt 
Jorifri T. Mitchell, Member U 
NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES 
PURSUANT TO 
THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
and in order to effectuate the policies of the 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' FAIR EMPLOYMENT ACT 
we hereby notify all employees of the County of Suffolk Legislature and the County of Suffolk (County) in 
the unit represented by the Suffolk County Association of Municipal Employees, Inc., that the County will 
forthwith: 
1. Rescind Resolution No. 315-1999. 
2. Not adopt legislative resolutions unilaterally granting Dresch a waiver of eligibility 
requirements for participation in its tuition reimbursement program. 
Dated By 
(Representative) (Title) 
COUNTY OF SUFFOLK LEGISLATURE & THE COUNTY OF SUFFOLK 
This Notice must remain posted for 30 consecutive days from the date of posting, and must not be altered, defaced, or covered by 
any other material. 
) 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, INC., 
LOCAL 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 
Charging Party, 
- a n d - CASE NO. U-21987 
STATE OF NEW YORK (STATE UNIVERSITY OF 
NEW YORK AT OSWEGO), 
Respondent. 
NANCY E. HOFFMAN, GENERAL COUNSEL (STEVEN A. CRAIN of counsel), 
for Charging Party 
WALTER J. PELLEGRINI, GENERAL COUNSEL (MAUREEN SEIDEL of 
counsel), for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This matter comes to us on exceptions filed by the State of New York (State 
University of New York at Oswego) (State) to an Administrative Law Judge's (ALJ) 
determination that the State violated §§209-a.1 (a) and (c) of the Public Employees' 
Fair Employment Act (Act) by including a specification in two amended notices of 
discipline issued August 11, 2000, and September 5, 2000, respectively, which alleged 
that Richard Dowd, a member of the unit represented by the Civil Service Employees 
Association, Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO (CSEA), intended to contact his 
Board - U-21987 -2 
bargaining agent regarding a dispute over the use of a certain room within one of the 
campus buildings. 
EXCEPTIONS 
The State excepted to the ALJ's decision on the law and the facts. Principally, 
the State argued that its motion to dismiss based on jurisdiction was denied, that the 
"but for" defense was ignored and the defense of mootness was rejected. 
FACTS 
We will confine our analysis to the salient facts relevant to our resolution of the 
exceptions. A detailed description of the facts is set forth in the ALJ's decision. 
A hearing took place on February 28, 2001, at which time CSEA presented its 
direct case. At the hearing, CSEA limited its charge to ^8 of the amended notices of 
discipline which it alleged plead a perse violation of §§209-a.1(a) and (c) of the Act by 
the State. The August 11, 2000, amended notice of discipline at fl8 stated that "[y]ou 
[Dowd] threatened to go to the union (CSEA) when Rebecca Hotaling told you that you 
could not take over the downstairs hall council room. . .." The September 5, 2000, 
amended notice of discipline at fl8 stated that "Rebecca Hotaling was confused and felt 
threatened when you said you were 'going to go to the union' when she told you, you 
could not take over the downstairs hall council room on Onondaga for an employee 
break room." At the conclusion of CSEA's direct case, the State moved to dismiss the 
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improper practice charge on the ground that CSEA failed to prove a prima facie case. 
The ALJ denied the motion and the State went forward with its case.1 
DISCUSSION 
The ALJ denied the State's motion to dismiss based upon lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction. We agree. Section 204.1 (a)(1) of the Rules permits the filing of a charge 
with the Director of Public Employment Practices of Representation (Director) alleging 
that a public employer or its agents . . . has engaged . . . in an improper practice 
Furthermore, paragraph two of the Details of Charge identifies the State of New York as 
the public employer. This, coupled with the State's appearance, is sufficient to identify 
the proper parties to confer jurisdiction.2 
The ALJ found that an employee has the right to seek the assistance of his or 
her union3 and that the employee's statement of his or her intent to do so is likewise 
protected by the Act.4 We agree. However, the ALJ concluded that the facts as pled 
and as presented at the hearing were tantamount to a perse violation of the Act. We 
1As the State did not raise the denial of its motion to dismiss for failure to prove a 
prima facie case in its exceptions, we are constrained by our Rules of Procedure 
(Rules) from reviewing this issue. See Rules, §213.6; see also Chenengo Forks Cent. 
Sch. Dist, 29 PERB fi3058 (1996); City of Dunkirk, 23 PERB ff3025 (1990). 
2New York Practice, Third Edition, David D. Siegel, West, p. 194. 
3See Cayuga-Onondaga Bd. of Cooperative Educ. Serv., 32 PERB 1J3079 
MQQCn 
\ • — / • 
4See Village of Scotia, 29 PERB H3071 (1996), cont'd in pertinent part, 241 
AD2d 29, 31 PERB 1J7008 (3rd Dep't 1998). 
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recently reevaluated the nature of a perse violation of §§209-a.1 (a) and (c) in 
Greenburgh #11 Union Free School District.5 In Greenburgh, we departed from our 
prior holdings and, in particular, State of New York.6 In that case, we first articulated a 
standard of proof that an employer's conduct which was so inherently destructive of a 
§202 right, was "irrebuttabiy presumed" to have been done "for the purpose of depriving 
[employees] of such rights."7 Such was the argument proffered by CSEA here in 
rebuttal to the State's motion to dismiss the charge.8 
We reasoned in Greenburgh that the Act requires deliberate conduct on the 
employer's part "for the purpose of depriving [public employees] of such rights" in order 
for a violation of §209-a.1(a) to be found.9 Thus, we said in Greenburgh, the concept of 
an irrebuttable presumption is no longer tenable because such an assumption is 
conclusive and can not be contradicted, modified or explained.10 
Here, the ALJ determined that the language of 1[8 of both amended 
specifications amounted to a perse violation. This was error. It was not Dowd's 
533PERB H3018(2000). 
610PERB p i 0 8 (1977). 
1
 Greenburgh, supra, at 3048. 
8Transcript, pp. 26-27. 
9Greenburgh, supra, at 3048= See also Town of Independence, 23 PERB 1T3020, 
at 3038 (1990), for the standard of proof in §§209-a.1(a) and (c) violations. 
^Greenburgh, supra, at 3048. 
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statement which prompted the issuance of the disciplinary notice. Dowd was disciplined 
for his numerous actions against Hotaling. The ALJ conceded in her decision that the 
State's conduct was not improperly motivated because fl8 in both specifications had 
been included as one of many examples of Dowd's attempts to bully and intimidate 
Hotaling. Thus, by inference, the ALJ found that the State's proof rebutted the 
presumption and, consequently, CSEA failed to prove that the State acted deliberately 
to deprive Dowd of a protected right. 
Since we have determined that the charge should have been dismissed for 
failure of proof, we need not reach the State's other exceptions. 
For the reason set forth above, we grant the State's second exception and 
' reverse the decision of the ALJ. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the charge be, and hereby is, dismissed. 
DATED: October 11, 2001 
Albany, New York -_ . 
^ 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
ROCKLAND COUNTY BOARD OF COOPERATIVE 
EDUCATIONAL SERVICES 
CASE NO. E-2220 
Upon the Application for Designation of 
Persons as Managerial or Confidential 
RAINS & POGREBIN, P.C. (RICHARD G. KASS of counsel), for Employer 
NANCY E. HOFFMAN, GENERAL COUNSEL (PAUL S . BAMBERGER of 
counsel), for Intervenor 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the Rockland County Board of 
Cooperative Educational Services (BOCES) to a decision of an Administrative Law 
Judge (ALJ) dismissing its application as to certain employees BOCES sought to be 
designated as confidential in accordance with the criteria set forth in §201.7(a) of the 
Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act).1 
1Section 201.7(a) defines the term "public employee" as "any person holding a 
position by appointment or employment in the service of a public employer, except that 
such term shall not include for the purposes of any provision of this article other than 
sections two hundred ten and two hundred eleven of this article, . . . persons . . . who 
may reasonably be designated from time to time as managerial or confidential upon 
application of the public employer to the appropriate board. . . . Employees may be 
designated as managerial only if they are persons (i) who formulate policy or (ii) who 
m a w r a a e r t n o h K ; h a r a m i i r a r l r\n h a h a l f n f f h a ruihl io o m r \ l n \ / c i r t n a c c i o t r\\ranH\/ in f h o 
1 I I U V I \ _ r U O v y i i G k ^ l V K/\S 1 U U U I I V-»»-i W l I h / W I l u l l W l kl l ^ k / U k / I I V Vvl I I L / I V ^ j t V^l H_* l*4vJ«_MV^k *-» I I v w u y • • • U I U 
preparation for and conduct of collective negotiations or to have a major role in the 
administration of agreements or in personnel administration provided that such role is 
not of a routine or clerical nature and requires the exercise of independent judgment. 
Employees may be designated as confidential only if they are persons who assist and 
act in a confidential capacity to managerial employees described in clause (ii)." 
Board - E-2220 -2 
All the titles sought to be designated are in a unit represented by the Civil 
Service Employees Association, Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO (CSEA). 
The ALJ designated as confidential Stephanie Sundheimer - Secretarial 
Assistant (personal secretary to the Assistant Superintendent for Human Resources); 
Carmela Bozzuti - Secretarial Assistant (personal secretary to the Assistant 
Superintendent for Educational Services); Mary Marino - Secretarial Assistant (personal 
secretary to the Assistant Superintendent for Business); and Laura Mastropolo-
Marshag - Accountant.2 The ALJ dismissed the application as to Judy Biase - Senior 
Clerk Typist; Joan Braun - Principal Clerk; and Eileen Harris - Clerk Typist. 
EXCEPTIONS 
The BOCES has filed exceptions to the ALJ's dismissal of the application as to 
Biase, Braun and Harris, arguing that the record supports their designation as 
confidential and that the ALJ should have relied on the employees' affidavits which 
were attached to the BOCES' application. CSEA has filed no exceptions and relies on 
its brief to the ALJ. 
FACTS 
CSEA called no witnesses at the hearing, effectively resting after the BOCES put 
in its case. BOCES called three witnesses, as here relevant: Assistant Superintendent 
for Human Resources, Paui Citarelia, and Assistant Superintendent for Educational 
Services, James Ryan. 
) 2At the hearing,.CSEA withdrew its objection to the designation of Mary Marino -
Secretarial Assistant (personal secretary to the Assistant Superintendent for Business). 
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Biase and Braun work for Citarella in Human Resources. As his title suggests, 
Citarella is responsible for the BOCES' labor relations, grievance administration and 
collective bargaining, as well as recruitment, hiring and retention of staff within the 
BOCES' three bargaining units. Although Citarella has never been designated by 
PERB, the ALJ correctly found that he is a managerial employee within the meaning of 
§201.7(a)(ii)oftheAct. 
Biase is responsible for maintaining all personnel files related to certificated 
employees and Braun is responsible for the personnel files of the classified employees. 
Both work in close proximity to each other and Citarella and Sundheimer. Biase is 
additionally responsible for opening all the mail that comes into the Human Resources 
office, including Citarella's mail, which she places in a file for his perusal.3 That mail 
includes correspondence from the BOCES Superintendent and other administrators, as 
well as the BOCES' outside labor counsel and includes information about contract 
negotiations, grievance and contract administration and on-going litigation.4 
Citarella testified that at the time of the hearing he had been in his current 
position for a little over one year and that, while he consults with other administrators 
and cabinet members when he is determining how to administer the collective 
bargaining agreements, he also consults with Sundheimer, Biase and Braun.5 As 
Citareiia is new to his position, he has sought to familiarize himseif not oniy with the 
3Transcript, p. 27. 
4Transcript, p. 83. 
5Transcript, p. 45. 
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terms of the various collective bargaining agreements but with past practices within the 
BOCES. To that end, Citarella has talked with Braun regarding personal days and leave 
time, hiring practices, seniority, and salary placement relating to classified personnel. 
Citarella testified that he has relied upon her input in formulating opinions and reaching 
._de.cisJons..6J.nJhe..coMrse..pLthose_discussJQns,XJtareJla._has.xev_ealed.to_.B.raun_what 
management's position would be with respect to at least one grievance. Braun has also 
given advice to Citarella about correspondence he has written, suggesting different 
language and a different, less direct approach, when dealing with the County Civil 
Service Commission.7 Likewise, with Biase, Citarella has sought her out for similar 
discussions related to the certificated staff, including accumulation of additional college 
credits and sick leave issues involving doctors' notes.8 
Harris is a Clerk Typist who works directly for Larry Pedersen, the BOCES 
District Superintendent, who is the chief executive officer of the BOCES and a 
managerial employee. Harris shares office space with the Superintendent's personal 
secretary and Clerk to the BOCES Board of Education, Mary Cramsie, who is 
unrepresented. Harris' desk is located in close proximity to Pedersen's office, Cramsie's 
desk, the BOCES Cabinet Room, Ryan's office, and Bozzuti's desk. Ryan testified that 
Harris performs essentially all of the tasks that are performed by Cramsie for the 
Superintendent, but that Cramsie is primarily responsible for typing Pedersen's 
•Transcript, p. 72. 
7Transcript, p. 33. 
Transcript, p. 53. 
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correspondence. Harris opens mail, files and photocopies all materials, including the 
Superintendent's weekly packet to the BOCES Board of Education. The mail and the 
weekly packet contain material related to labor relations, litigation, organizational 
structure, and other matters to be discussed in executive session.9 Ryan testified that 
because ofthe close.proximity..ofthe desks in this office and their location in relation to 
his office, Pedersen's office and the Cabinet Room, Harris, Cramsie and Bozzuti all 
have access to conversations taking place in the offices and Cabinet Room. 
DISCUSSION 
In Town ofDewitt (hereafter, Dew/ft),10 we held that: 
The definition of a confidential employee incorporates a 
two-part test for designation. The person to be designated 
must assist a §201.7(a)(ii) manager in the delivery of the 
) duties described in that subdivision, (footnote omitted) 
Assistance alone, however, is not enough to support a 
designation. In addition, the person assisting the 
§201.7(a)(ii) manager must be one acting in a confidential 
capacity to that manager. 
This record clearly supports the designation of Biase, Braun and Harris as 
confidential. The only testimony offered was that of the three BOCES Assistant 
Superintendents. Their testimony was not controverted. 
Citarella credibly and clearly testified to the confidential duties performed by 
Biase and Braun. Biase is responsible for opening all the mail received in the Human 
Resources office, including that which deals with negotiations, grievances, arbitrations 
and litigation. Such exnosure is sufficient, in and of itself to conclude that Biase meets 
9Transcript, pp.167-169. 
) 
1032 PERB TJ3001, at 3002 (1999). 
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the first prong of the Dewitt test because she is exposed to material which is not 
appropriate for the eyes and ears of rank-and-file personnel.11 Biase is also consulted 
by Citarella on contractual matters relating to the certificated personnel. 
Braun has access to personnel files and works with them daily. In the course of 
her duties, Citarella testified that Braun sometimes prepares correspondence lor him on 
matters related to the classified BOCES personnel and has advised him on the content 
of that correspondence. Braun obtains information for Citarella in the processing of 
grievances during which he has, on at least one occasion, revealed to her what 
BOCES' position would be on the merits of the grievance. Clearly, Braun also meets the 
first prong of the Dewitt test because she not only has access to all the files in the 
Human Resources office, but she works with them on a regular basis without 
restriction.12 
Both Biase and Braun meet the second prong of the Dewitt test because of the 
confidential nature of Citarella's discussions with them. Both employees have been 
consulted by Citarella on questions of past practice and contract interpretation, as well 
as their general knowledge of the BOCES' operation and the staff. They serve in a 
"position of trust and confidence vis-a-vis" Citarella.13 That there have only been a few 
instances referred to by Citarella does not, as found by the ALJ, warrant a different 
conclusion. At the time of the hearing, Citarella had only held his position for a little over 
uWappingers Cent. Sch. Dist, 19 PERB P059 (1986). 
12/d. 
13Supra, note 9. 
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a year. The number of discussions he testified about and the nature of those 
discussions, given his short tenure in office, are sufficient to establish that Citarella 
confides in them on a regular basis.14 
Harris performs confidential duties for Pedersen, the BOCES Superintendent. 
She opens his mail on a regular basis and is involved with Cramsie in the preparation of 
the weekly packet for the BOCES Board of Education. Included in the mail and in the 
packet are negotiation materials, litigation information and grievance materials. Regular 
exposure to such materials is not appropriate for the eyes and ears of rank-and-file 
employees.15 Harris' duties clearly meet the first prong of the Dewitt test. 
The record establishes that Harris performs essentially the same duties as 
Cramsie on a regular basis and, indeed, functions as an additional personal secretary 
to the Superintendent. Her relationship to Pedersen as one of his two secretaries, her 
close proximity to his office and the set-up of the Executive offices and Pedersen's 
assignment to Harris of the responsibility for sensitive, confidential materials on a 
regular basis support our finding that Harris functions in a confidential capacity with 
Pedersen. A confidential relationship is inherent in the nature of the two positions 
themselves and is evidenced by the nature of the duties assigned by Pedersen to 
Harris.16 
oee ivonn txose-vvoicoti oenr. ocn. uist, oo rtma "ipuu^ (zuuu). 
A5Supra, note 11. See also Kenmore-Town of Tonawanda Union Free Sch. Dist., 
26 PERB 1J4021 (1993). 
16Sivpra, note 10. 
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Based on the foregoing, we grant the BOCES1 exceptions. We therefore, affirm 
the decision of the ALJ in part and reversein part the decision of the ALJ.17 
Therefore, BOCES' application to designate the following titles as confidential is 








DATED: October 11, 2001 
Albany, New York 
Secretarial Assistant (personal secretary 
to Assistant Superintendent for Human 
Resources) 
Senior Clerk Typist (Assistant Superintendent 
for Human Resources) 
Principal Clerk (Assistant Superintendent for 
Human Resources) 
Secretarial Assistant (Assistant Superintendent 
for Educational Services) 
Secretarial Assistant (Assistant Superintendent 
for Business) 
Clerk Typist (BOCES Superintendent) 
Accountant 
fi 
Michael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
/.Ink/nT Mitr.hfill. M 
17Because of our finding herein, we need not address the BOCES' other 
exception. 
) 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
PATROLMEN'S BENEVOLENT ASSOCIATION 
OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, INC., 
Petitioner, 
- and - CASE NO. M-201-146 
CITY OF NEW YORK, 
Employer. 
GLEASON, DUNN, WALSH & O'SHEA (RONALD DUNN, of counsel), for 
Petitioner 
ALAN SCHLESINGER, GENERAL COUNSEL, OFFICE OF LABOR 
RELATIONS, for Employer 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the City of New York (City) to 
rulings made by the Director of Conciliation (Director) in conjunction with impasse 
proceedings initiated by the Patrolmen's Benevolent Association of the City of New 
York, Inc., (PBA) under §§209.2, 209.3 and 209.4 of the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act (Act) and Part 205 of our Rules of Procedure (Rules). The City excepts 
to the Director's determination that an impasse exists in the negotiations for a 
successor collective bargaining agreement between the City and the PBA and to his 
appointment of a mediator. 
) 
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The City alleges in its exceptions that the Director should have stayed his ruling 
on the PBA's declaration of impasse because of pending litigation before the Court of 
Appeals and that the parties had not negotiated to impasse and, therefore, the PBA's 
declaration of impasse was premature. The PBA responds that the Court of Appeals 
denied the City's application to enjoin all proceedings before PERB, including 
mediation. The PBA further argues that the parties have reached a genuine deadlock in 
negotiations and require the assistance of a mediator. 
In reaching his determination to appoint a mediator, the Director reviewed the 
PBA's December 15, 2000 declaration of impasse and the City's response, as well as 
the ongoing litigation. The mediator was appointed on August 15, 2001. 
The Act was amended in 1998 to remove the exclusion of police officers 
employed by the City from the coverage of the impasse resolution procedures available 
under §209.4.1 On May 4, 2000, the PBA and the City commenced negotiations for a 
successor agreement to their 1995-2000 collective bargaining agreement. The 
Appellate Division's decision, from which the City has appealed, summarizes the 
procedural history of the parties' dispute: 
[During negotiations] the City filed a scope of bargaining 
petition with the...Board of Collective Bargaining of the City 
of New York (hereinafter BCB). In response, the PBA 
answered, claiming that...[the] Public Employment Relations 
Board (hereinafter PERB) had sole, exclusive jurisdiction 
over scope of bargaining issues and, thereafter, filed a 
declaration of impasse with PERB. In this declaratory 
judgment action, the PBA seeks a declaration that PERB 
has exclusive jurisdiction to resolve disputes between it and 
the City concerning the scope of bargaining and/or the 
11998NYLawsch. 641. 
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existence of an impasse in negotiations and an order 
directing BCB to dismiss the petition of the City. 
Simultaneously, the City commenced an action against the 
PBA, PERB and BCB for judgment declaring that chapter 
641 of the Laws of 1998 (Civil Service Law §212[3j) 
(hereinafter chapter 641) is unconstitutional and that BCB 
has exclusive jurisdiction over any impasse which may arise 
during the collective bargaining negotiations between it and 
. the PBA and to determine scope of bargaining issues, 
whether within or without the context of an impasse. 
Additionally, the City sought a permanent injunction 
forbidding the enforcement of chapter 641. 
Following consolidation of the actions, the PBA ~ 
moved for summary judgment declaring the constitutionality 
of the statute. In opposition, PERB cross-moved for 
dismissal of the complaint asserting that declaratory relief 
was unavailable, all administrative remedies had not been 
exhausted and the determinations of these administrative 
agencies regarding the breadth of their respective 
jurisdictions was entitled to judicial deference. The City 
cross-moved for summary judgment contending that chapter 
641 was unconstitutional since it was enacted either in 
violation of the home rule provision of the State Constitution 
or was an improper delegation of legislative authority. In the 
alternative, the City sought denial of the PBA's motion so 
that necessary discovery could be concluded. Supreme 
Court, inter alia, granted the PBA's motion for summary 
judgment finding no violation of the State Constitution and 
further ruled that jurisdiction of scope of bargaining issues 
was properly placed with PERB. This appeal followed.2 
The Appellate Division affirmed the decision of Supreme Court3, finding that 
chapter 641 was constitutional and that PERB had exclusive jurisdiction over impasse 
and scope of negotiation issues between the City and the PBA. It was then that the 
2Patroimen's benevolent Ass'n of the uityofNew York, inc. v. City of New York 
and NYS PERB, 2001 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 7388, 34 PERB 1J7026, at 7044 (3d Dep't 
2002). 
3Patrolmen's Benevolent Ass'n of the City of New York, Inc. v. City of New York 
and NYS PERB, 188 Misc2d 146, 34 PERB 1J7017 (Sup. Ct. Albany County 2001). 
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Director considered the PBA's declaration of impasse, filed eight months earlier. The 
Court of Appeals thereafter denied the City's motion for a stay pending disposition of its 
appeal to that court.4 
The City argues that the Director should have, nonetheless, postponed his 
appointmentjDf a mediator until the Court of;Appeals decided the City's appeal of the 
Appellate Division's decision, because if the City prevailed on appeal, the impasse 
declaration would not be within PERB's jurisdiction. The City also argues that the 
Director should not have acted in order to give the parties an additional opportunity to 
negotiate because the City had recently settled contract negotiations with other unions 
representing uniformed personnel which might have changed the tenor of the 
negotiations between the PBA and the City. 
The City further argues that the parties had met only nine times before the PBA 
declared impasse and that there had only been one negotiating session after the PBA 
had articulated the specifics of its proposed salary increase. This, the City argues, 
evidences the PBA's desire to proceed directly to arbitration. The PBA argues that 
PERB was free to proceed on the declaration of impasse once the Appellate Division's 
stay expired and that the parties had negotiated to a point of deadlock which required 
the assistance of a mediator in order to move forward. 
^Patrolmen's Benevolent Ass'n of the City of New York, Inc. v. City of New York 
and NYS PERB, _ NY2d_, 34 PERB ^7029 (September 20, 2001). 
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We clearly have the authority to review the Director's appointment of a mediator5 
and, having done so here, we determine, based upon the submissions made to the 
Director, that he properly appointed the mediator.6 We, therefore, confirm the 
designation of a mediator by the Director in this matter. SO ORDERED. 
DATED: October 11, 2001 
Albany, New York 
Midaael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
Marc AVAbboti, Member 
/ /John T. Mitchell, Member 
5Board ofEduc. of the City Sch. Dist. of the City of New York, 34 PERB fl3016 
(2001) and cases cited therein. 
6City ofNewburgh v. PERB, 97 AD2d 258 (3d Dep't 1983), aff'd 63 NY2d 793 
(1984). 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
CORTLAND COUNTY POLICE ASSOCIATION, 
Petitioner; 
-and- CASE NO. C-5093 




CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, INC., 
LOCAL 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 
Intervenor. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding1 having been conducted in the above matter by the 
Public Employment Relations Board in accordance with the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act and the Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public Employees' Fair 
-The current representative, the Civil Service Employees Association, Inc., Local 1000, 
AFSCME, AFL-CIO, has disclaimed interest in further representing this unit of 
employees which has been fragmented from an overall unit of employees of the joint 
employer. 
Certification - C-5093 - 2 -
Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Cortland County Police Association has 
been designated and selected by a majority of the employees of the above-named 
public employer, in the unit agreed upon by the parties and described below, as their 
exclusive representative for the purpose of collective negotiations and the settlement of 
grievances. 
Included: County Police Officer, County Police Corporal, County Police 
Sergeant, County Police Lieutenant, and County Police Captain. 
Excluded: All other employees. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer shall 
negotiate collectively with the Cortland County Police Association. The duty to 
negotiate collectively includes the mutual obligation to meet at reasonable times and 
confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of 
employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising thereunder, 
and the execution of a written agreement incorporating any agreement reached if 
requested by either party. Such obligation does not compel either party to agree to a 
proposal or require the making of a concession. 
DATED: October 11, 2001 
Albany, New York >* r\ s—\ (_ -^lx. 
Michael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
/ fac A. 'Abbdft, Member 
n T. Mitchell, Member 
^ 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
JAMESTOWN CITY ADMINISTRATIVE ASSOCIATION, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-5065 
CITY OF JAMESTOWN, 
Employer. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the above matter by the 
Public Employment Relations Board in accordance with the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act and the Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Jamestown City Administrative Association 
has been designated and selected by a majority of the employees of the above-named 
public employer, in the unit agreed upon by the parties and described below, as their 
exclusive representative lortne purpose of collective negotiations anu the settlement of 
grievances. 
Certification - C-5065 -2 
Included: Account clerk typist/deputy registrar, account clerk typist/finance, 
administrative assistant to the assessor, assessor, assistant civil 
engineer, assistant recreation facility manager, building 
maintenance supervisor, computer programmer, deputy director of 
parks recreation & con., engineering technician, equipment 
manager, operations engineer, parks manager, principal account 
clerk/information services, programmer/analyst, real property 
appraiser, semi-skilled laborer/ice rink, senior account clerk 
typist/finance, senior typist/youth services, stenographic 
secretary/DPW, stenographic secretary/personnel, street & sewer 
supervisor, traffic engineering supervisor, and working crew chief. 
Excluded: All other employees. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer shall 
negotiate collectively with the Jamestown City Administrative Association. The duty to 
negotiate collectively includes the mutual obligation to meet at reasonable times and 
confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of 
employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising thereunder, 
and the execution of a written agreement incorporating any agreement reached if 
requested by either party. Such obligation does not compel either party to agree to a 
proposal or require the making of a concession. 
DATED: October 11, 2001 
Albany, New York 
"^ "^  iA^Uyc/tt<Ay^f~-(—<-<iZ^~~r 
\L<i ael R. Cuevasi Chairman 
A 7J 
9 
Marc A^TAbbott, Member 
n T. Mitchell, Member 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
UNITED PUBLIC SERVICE EMPLOYEES UNION, 
'- Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-5119 
NEW HYDE PARK-GARDEN CITY PARK UNION 
FREE SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Employer. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the above matter by the 
Public Employment Relations Board in accordance with the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act and the Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the United Public Service Employees Union has 
been designated and selected by a majority of the employees of the above-named 
public employer, in the unit agreed upon by the parties and described below, as their 
exclusive representative for the purpose of collective negotiations and the settlement of 
grievances. 
^1 
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Included: All full-time and part-time Teacher Aides. 
Excluded: All other employees. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer shall 
negotiate col I ecti vely with the United Pu bI i c: ServiceEmpl oyees Uini on._ The duty to 
negotiate collectively includes the mutual obligation to meet at reasonable times and 
confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of 
employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising thereunder, 
and the execution of a written agreement incorporating any agreement reached if 
requested by either party. Such obligation does not compel either party to agree to a 
proposal or require the making of a concession. 
DATED: October 11, 2001 
Albany, New York 
; 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, 
INC., LOCAL 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASENO.C-5113 




BELLEVILLE HENDERSON SUPPORT STAFF 
ASSOCIATION, 
Intervenor. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding1 having been conducted in the above matter by the 
Public Employment Relations Board in accordance with the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act and the Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Civil Service Employees Association, Inc., 
-The former bargaining representative, the Belleville Henderson Support Staff 
Association, is defunct. 
Certification - C-5113 - 2 -
) 
Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO has been designated and selected by a majority of the 
employees of the above-named public employer, in the unit agreed upon by the parties 
and described below, as their exclusive representative for the purpose of collective 
negotiations and the settlementof grievances. _._ 
Included: Teacher Aide, Registered Professional Nurse, Cleaner, Bus Driver, 
Food Service Helper, Monitor, CSE/Home School Coordinator, 
Cashier, Dental Hygienist, Teacher Assistant, Bus Driver/Cleaner, 
Monitor/Food Service Helper. 
Excluded: All other employees. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer shall 
negotiate collectively with the Civil Service Employees Association, Inc., Local 1000, 
AFSCME, AFL-CIO. The duty to negotiate collectively includes the mutual obligation to 
meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and 
other terms and conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or any 
question arising thereunder, and the execution of a written agreennent incorporating any 
agreement reached if requested by either party. Such obligation does not compel 
either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a concession. 
DATED: October 11, 2001 
Albany, New York 
Michael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
/ /} /? /7//1-/ l/(A* /J f/MM 
/ M a r c X Abbott," M e m W " 
John T. Mitchell, Member 
